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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7312

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

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AMEMBASSY BRAZILIA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY CARACAS

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 TOKYO 3052

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORC, PFOR, JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE MULTILATERAL INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES AND MODUS
OPERANDI

REF: STATE 037591

1. PER INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL, THIS TELEGRAM SURVEYS
MAJOR JAPANESE MULTILATERAL INTERESTS. PART I LISTS
THOSE MULTILATERAL ISSUES EMBASSY BELIEVES CERTAIN TO
ENGAGE THE ATTENTION OF TOP JAPANESE POLICYMAKERS DURING
THE YEAR. PART II BRIEFLY TREATS THE RELATIONSHIP OF
JAPAN'S BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INTERESTS, THE KEY
FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON JAPAN'S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY, AND
JAPAN'S "MULTILATERAL STYLE."

PART I - JAPAN'S MULTILATERAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

2. 7TH SPECIAL SESSION ISSUES

(A) CIEC: JAPAN SEEKS CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE AND
INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE CONSENSUS SOLUTION OF ISSUES, AND
TO THIS END ENCOURAGES POSITIVE APPROACH TO INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES BY OPEC AND OTHER LDC'S.
ABOVE ALL, JAPAN WILL STRIVE TO AVOID ANY SITUATION
THREATENING STABLE SUPPLY OF FUEL AND OTHER RAW
MATERIALS TO JAPAN. IT WILL WORK FOR A STRUCTURE OF AID
TO LDC'S AND TRADE IN COMMODITIES WHICH IS DURABLE,
RESPONSIVE TO MARKET FORCES, NOT TERRIBLY EXPENSIVE
TO JAPAN, AND MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE TO LDC'S.
IN CIEC ENERGY COMMISSION, JAPANESE WILL STRIVE
TO DEPOLITICIZE ENERGY QUESTIONS AND TO EDUCATE PRODUCERS
CONCERNING IMPACT OF ENERGY PRICES ON WORLD ECONOMY.
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ALTHOUGH SECURITY OF SUPPLY IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE,
JAPANESE DOUBT PRODUCERS WILL GIVE MEANINGFUL GUARANTEE,
AND HENCE SEE NOTHING TO BE GAINED BY AGREEING TO
INDEXATION. HOWEVER, SHOULD DEMAND FOR OIL REBOUND,
THE PRODUCERS REMAIN ADAMANT AND OTHER DC'S, ESPECIALLY
THE US, WAVER, JAPAN MAY ACCEPT SOME FORM OF INCOME
PROTECTION FOR PRODUCERS.

IN CIEC RAW MATERIALS COMMISSION, JAPAN HOPES TO USE ITS CO-CHAIRMANSHIP TO DEMONSTRATE SYMPATHY FOR LDC ASPIRATIONS AND TO DEVELOP ROLE AS CONCILIATOR, BUT WITHOUT BREAKING RANKS WITH DC'S. JAPAN ALSO SEEKS IDENTIFICATION AS DC SPOKESMAN FOR ASPIRATIONS OF ASIA; IT MAY IN THIS VEIN SEEK TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON COMMODITY TRADE ISSUES OF VITAL INTEREST TO SEA STATES-- TIN, RUBBER AND HARDWOOD TIMBER.

IN DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, JAPAN'S OBJECTIVES APPEAR YET UNFORMED. GOJ REALIZES IT CANNOT ESCAPE TAKING CLEAR POSITIONS ON ISSUES WHICH ARISE, AND FURTHER HOPES TO MESH DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION ACTIVITY SMOOTHLY WITH UNCTAD IV. (SEE ALSO TOKYO 2776 AND 75 TOKYO 18064.)

(B) MTN: JAPAN PLACES MAJOR EMPHASIS ON LIBERALIZATION OF WORLD TRADE, ESPECIALLY IN INDUSTRIAL GOODS. IT ALSO SUPPORTS NOTION OF MAKING MTN ATTRACTIVE TO LDC'S AND THEREBY ENCOURAGING CONSTRUCTIVE LDC ROLE. HOWEVER, DOMESTIC PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES, ESPECIALLY IN SOME AGRICULTURAL SECTORS, LIMIT CONCESSIONS GOJ WILL OFFER AT LEAST WHILE RECESSION CONTINUES AND GENERAL ELECTIONS ARE ON HORIZON. GOJ HOPES TO STAY OUT OF US-EC DISPUTES.

(C) IFAD: JAPAN WILL PARTICIPATE, BUT FINANCE MINISTRY EFFORTS TO WHITTLE DOWN DOLS 60-70 MILLION "FAIR SHARE" CONTRIBUTION ORIGINALLY FLOATED SEEM LIKELY TO SUCCEED.

(D) UNCTAD IV: JAPAN IS LIKELY TO SEEK TO FOSTER DIALOGUE IN LOW-KEY WAY, TO STAY WITH DC PACK ON SUBSTANCE, BUT AVOID INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE APPEARANCE OF OPPOSITION TO LDC AIMS. HOWEVER, IT IS NEGATIVE TO EXPANDED
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INSTITUTIONAL ROLE FOR UNCTAD WITH EFFECT OF GIVING LDC MAJORITY GREATER INFLUENCE OVER INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AID AND MONETARY DECISIONS. (SEE ALSO TOKYO 2776.)

(E) IEA: JAPAN'S MAIN INTERESTS ARE: TO COORDINATE INDUSTRIAL CONSUMER STRATEGIES IN THE CIEC ENERGY COMMISSION; TO PARTICIPATE IN AND HAVE MAXIMUM ACCESS TO RESULTS OF EFFORTS TO DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE ENERGY RESOURCES; TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE OPERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES. NOW THAT JAPAN HAS ACQUIESCED TO MSP, US AND JAPANESE APPROACHES SHOULD ALIGN FAIRLY CLOSELY BUT THERE WILL BE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS AND DEGREE, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE "TRANSPARENCY" OF MAJOR OIL COMPANIES' ACTIVITY. (SEE ALSO TOKYO 1015.)

(F) DEBT RESCHEDULING: JAPAN IS IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE US INSISTENCE ON CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH.

3. DISARMAMENT ISSUES

(A) BECAUSE JAPAN MUST DEPEND ALMOST TOTALLY ON THE US AND THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE FOR ITS SECURITY, DISARMAMENT IS A PRIMARY FOREIGN POLICY GOAL. JAPAN IS AN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PARTICIPANT IN ALMOST ALL DISARMAMENT EFFORTS--AT THE UN, IN THE CCD, THE IAEA, AND THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS' DISCUSSIONS. OPPOSITION BY LDP RIGHT-WINGERS HAS SO FAR FORESTALLED JAPAN'S RATIFICATION OF THE NPT, BUT WITH INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY AND CONTINUED ACCESS TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS AT STAKE, RATIFICATION IS THE GOJ'S PRIORITY FOREIGN POLICY LEGISLATIVE GOAL.

(B) THE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AND COOPERATION WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED US-JAPAN RELATIONS ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS ALMOST SURELY WILL CONTINUE. ALTHOUGH THE GOJ WISHES WE WOULD MOVE FASTER TOWARD SECURITY MEASURES FOR NNWS, AND TOWARD CONCLUSION OF A CTB AND CBT TREATIES, IT UNDERSTANDS US DIFFICULTIES. TOKYO FULLY SUPPORTS THE SALT AS A VITAL ELEMENT OF GLOBAL DISARMAMENT EFFORTS. (SEE ALSO TOKYO 1718.)

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JAPAN IS NOW QUITE INTENT ON CONCLUSION OF AN OMNIBUS TREATY, INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE ALONG LINES FAVORED BY MAJOR MARITIME POWERS (GROUP OF FIVE). KEY ELEMENTS IN JAPANESE

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VIEW ARE 12 MILE TERRITORIAL SEA WITH PROVISION FOR
FREE PASSAGE THROUGH ENCLOSED STRAITS, 200 MILE ECONOMIC
ZONE INCORPORATING PRINCIPLE OF FULL UTILIZATION OF
RESOURCES AND OTHER COASTAL STATE OBLIGATIONS TO GUARANTEE
TRADITIONAL FISHING RIGHTS THEREIN, AND PROVISION FOR

EXPLOITATION OF SEABEDS BY PRIVATE ENTERPRISE. IMPORTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO JAPAN, WHICH HAS WORLD'S LARGEST MERCHANT MARINE AND WHICH DEPENDS ON OCEANS FOR 50 PERCENT OF ITS ANIMAL PROTEIN, CANNOT BE OVERSTATED. (SEE ALSO TOKYO 1800.)

5. RELATIONSHIP TO ASEAN

ESTABLISHMENT OF A DURABLE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH ASEAN HAS IN RECENT MONTHS BECOME A MAJOR GOAL OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY. IMPORTANT ECONOMIC RELATIONS, TRADITIONAL TIES AND IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITIES IMPEL JAPAN TOWARD POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ASEAN STATES, BILATERALLY AND COLLECTIVELY. JAPAN SEEKS TO BOLSTER THEIR STABILITY (LARGELY THROUGH ECONOMIC AID) AND TO FACILITATE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN ASEAN AND THE INDOCHINESE STATES. JAPAN SEES ITSELF AS COMPLEMENTING THE US IN COUNTERBALANCING MOSCOW, PEKING AND HANOI IN THE REGION, AND THEREFORE DESIRES COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE USG, TAILORED TO ASIAN SENSITIVITIES. (SEE ALSO 75 TOKYO 14684.)

6. REFORM OF THE ILO

THE GOJ IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ILO. IT WILL SUPPORT US EFFORTS TO BLOCK PROCEDURAL CHANGES WEAKENING INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES, BUT WILL NOT CONSIDER WITHDRAWING ITSELF UNDER VIRTUALLY ANY CIRCUMSTANCE. (SEE ALSO 75 TOKYO 16986.)

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7. UN ISSUES

(A) THE KOREAN QUESTION: JAPAN REGARDS STABILITY OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA AS A VITAL INTEREST. THE KOREAN QUESTION IS THE ONLY UN ISSUE WHICH REGULARLY AROUSES HEATED DOMESTIC DEBATE. IN THE NEAR TERM JAPAN SEEKS PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO; IN THE LONGER TERM IT SEEKS TO ENCOURAGE DIALOGUE AND CONCILIATION IN DEALINGS BETWEEN THE KOREAS. JAPAN WOULD IDEALLY LIKE TO AVOID THE ANNUAL UNGA CONFRONTATION BUT WILL SUPPORT THE ROK-US EFFORT STRONGLY SO LONG AS THERE IS NO SUSPICION OF A DIRECT US-DPRK "DEAL." (SEE ALSO 75 TOKYO 14745.)

(B) THE PALESTINE QUESTION: JAPAN WILL PLAY A NARROW AND DEFENSIVE BUT, IT HOPES, CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. THOUGH VITALLY DEPENDENT ON THE US AS WELL AS ON ITS ARAB OIL SUPPLIERS, JAPAN IS LIKELY ON THIS ISSUE TO CONTINUE TO GIVE GROUND IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ARAB MODERATES. JAPAN CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECTED TO STRONG PRESSURES FROM ARAB STATES TO JOIN IN THEIR DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL RELINQUISH "OCCUPIED TERRITORIES." JAPAN'S VITAL INTEREST IS PREVENTION OF ANOTHER WAR OR,

SHOULD IT OCCUR, AVOIDANCE OF AN EMBARGO DIRECTED AT JAPAN.

(C) CODE FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE GOJ WILL PROBABLY SUPPORT A MODERATE CODE DEVELOPED AND PUT FORWARD IN THE OECD CONTEXT. WHILE IT FEARS THAT A STRONG CODE MIGHT IMPACT ADVERSELY ON THE PRACTICES OF JAPANESE TRADING COMPANIES ABROAD, THE CURRENT LOCKHEED REVELATIONS MAKE IT HARDER TO OPPOSE REASONABLE-APPEARING MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST ABUSES OF POWER BY FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS.

(D) ANTI-COLONIALISM/SOUTHERN AFRICA: JAPAN'S INSTINCTS ARE STRONGLY AGAINST TRADITIONAL FORMS OF COLONIALISM, BUT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ITS FAR-FLUNG ECONOMIC INTERESTS IT HAS INCREASINGLY BEEN ACCUSED WITH THE WESTERN DC'S OF NEO-COLONIALISM. RACISM IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT MORAL ISSUE IN JAPAN; ITS MAJOR OBJECTIVE WHEN RHODESIA, SOUTH AFRICA, ZIONISM-EQUALS-RACISM AND LIKE ISSUES ARISE IS TO MAINTAIN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS BUT TO MINIMIZE THE CRITICISM IT RECEIVES FOR DOING SO.

(E) UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY: ALTHOUGH THE UNU IS JAPAN'S ONE BIG MULTILATERAL INITIATIVE, EMPHASIS IS CONFIDENTIAL

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NOW BEING PLACED ON OBTAINING FUNDS FROM THE US BY RAISING IT AS A BILATERAL ISSUE. IN MULTILATERAL FORA JAPAN WILL RESIST OTHER STATES' EFFORTS TO "POLITICIZE" UNU BY PLACING IT UNDER MORE DIRECT UN CONTROL. (SEE ALSO 75 TOKYO 13289.)

(F) HUMAN RIGHTS: JAPAN WILL SUPPORT US INITIATIVES, PARTICULARLY IF WESTERN EUROPE IS ON BOARD, BUT WILL NOT TAKE THE LEAD.

(G) REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS: IF ASKED, JAPAN WILL REAFFIRM ITS DESIRE FOR A PERMANENT SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT IT WILL NOT ACTIVELY PUSH THIS GOAL, NOR WILL IT PRESS FOR GENERAL CHARTER REVIEW. INSTEAD, JAPAN WILL SEEK TO KEEP SEMI-PERMANENT CONTROL OF ONE OF ASIAN SEATS ON SECURITY COUNCIL AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED.

PART II - JAPAN'S MULTILATERAL STYLE

8. MILITARILY IMPOTENT AND RESOURCE-POOR, JAPAN RELIES ON AN INCREASINGLY ACTIVE, FLEXIBLE AND ABOVE ALL DEFENSIVE DIPLOMACY. IN ADDITION TO THE US CONNECTION, PARAMOUNT SINCE 1945, JAPAN SEEKS STABLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH, IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, THE OIL PRODUCERS AND THE MAJOR PRODUCERS OF OTHER RAW MATERIALS. WITHIN RECENT MEMORY, JAPAN'S ALIGNMENT WITH US POSITIONS IN MULTINATIONAL FORA WAS SEMI-AUTOMATIC, BUT THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN'S OWN INTERESTS TO GLOBAL SCOPE, THE DECREASING RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE JAPAN-US

ECONOMIC TIES, AND WHAT THE JAPANESE OFTEN PERCEIVE AS EXCESSIVE US ATTACHMENT TO POINTS OF PRINCIPLE HAVE LED TO DIVERGENCES, SOME SUBSTANTIAL, ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES.

9. JAPAN'S IMPULSES ARE TOWARD PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO ON MOST QUESTIONS. IT FOUND THE WORLD FROM THE EARLY '50'S TO THE EARLY '70'S VERY CONGENIAL TO THE SATISFACTION OF ITS POSTWAR GOALS, PARTICULARLY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH. JAPAN HAS BEEN SLOW TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPLICATIONS OF ITS EMERGENCE AS A WORLD POWER IN ECONOMIC TERMS. IT HAS CONTINUED TO "THINK POOR" AND TO VIEW ITSELF AS ATTEMPTING TO COPE WITH WORLD FORCES WHICH IT CAN INFLUENCE ONLY marginally IF AT ALL. JAPAN'S DIPLOMACY IS TRADITIONALLY LOW-KEY AND AIMS NOT
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TO MAKE A CONSENSUS AS MUCH AS TO JOIN IT OR YIELD TO IT AT THE PROPER TIME. IN MULTILATERAL FORA PARTICULARLY, JAPAN'S ROLE HAS BEEN LARGELY PASSIVE, REACTIVE AND AIMED AT AVOIDING ADVERSE IMPACTS OR "SHOCKS" ON JAPAN. THIS BASIC ORIENTATION WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS, FOR REASONS SUGGESTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO SEE THE JAPANESE SILHOUETTE ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES RISE marginally IN THIS AND SUCCEEDING YEARS. ONE SIGN OF A DEVELOPING DISPOSITION TOWARD MORE INDEPENDENT MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY IS THE BEGINNING OF A SEARCH FOR A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE ASEAN STATES. ANOTHER REELECTION OF JAPAN'S MORE COMPLICATED MULTILATERAL UNIVERSE IS ITS LESSENING RELUCTANCE TO TAKE DISTINCTIVELY SOFTER POSITIONS THAN WE ON SUCH UN ISSUES AS KOREA AND PALESTINE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 TOKYO 3052

10. DEPENDING ON THE MULTILATERAL ISSUE IN QUESTION,
JAPAN'S REFERENCE GROUP VARIES. THOUGH JAPANESE ARE
STRONGLY PERSUADED THAT JAPAN IS SUI GENERIS AND JAPANESE
EXPERIENCE UNIQUE, JAPAN HAS SINCE THE WAR FELT MOST

COMFORTABLE IN CONCERT WITH THE WESTERN DC'S. IT WAS OF COURSE MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE WHEN THE WEST COMMANDED A RELIABLE UN MAJORITY. THE JAPANESE SEE THEIR POSITION AS BEING PARTICULARLY IN ECONOMIC RESPECTS ANALOGOUS TO THE EEC'S, AND USE THE EEC POSTURE, ESPECIALLY WEST GERMANY'S, ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES AS A KEY REFERENCE POINT.

11. THE ASIAN STATES -- ONLY SOMETIMES INCLUDING CHINA OR THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT ARE JAPAN'S OTHER IMPORTANT REFERENCE GROUP. CHARY OF EVOKING WORLD WAR II MEMORIES JAPAN HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN MOST DISCREET IN ASIAN COMPANY, BUT THERE ARE NOW ABUNDANT SIGNS OF EFFORT TO STIMULATE AN "ASIAN CONSENSUS" ON CERTAIN ISSUES.

12. IF IN GOOD COMPANY -- I.E., A RESPECTABLE MAJORITY OF EITHER THE ESTERN DC'S OR THE ASIANS -- JAPAN IS NOW SOMETIMES TO BE FOUND VOTING AGAINST THE MAJORITY IN MULTILATERAL FORA. JAPAN OFTEN PLAYS AN ACTIVE LOBBYING ROLE (WHICH NOURISHES ITS SELF-PERCEPTION AS A BROKER AND CONCILATOR) BUT ONLY ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES IN WHICH IT PERCEIVES A VITAL STAKE WILL IT MAKE REPRESENTATIONS IN FOREIGN CAPITALS.

13. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT JAPANESE DELEGATES TO MAJOR INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS ARE (1) CAREFULLY INSTRUCTED, AFTER VIA A CABINET DECISION; (2) VERY UNLIKELY TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP WITHOUT NEW INSTRUCTIONS; AND (3) CAREFUL TO REPORT QUICKLY, FULLY AND ACCURATELY. THIS POINTS UP CONFIDENTIAL

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THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF EARLY CONSULTATION WITH THE JAPANESE ON TACTICAL INITIATIVES. US REPS SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT NEW YORK-TOKYO TIME ZONE DIFFERENCE SLOWS TOKYO RESPONSE.

14. JAPANESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND CHIEF DELEGATES ARE ALMOST ALWAYS VERY SENIOR CAREER DIPLOMATS. MOST HAVE SOME INFORMAL TIE TO ONE OR ANOTHER LDP FACTION, WHICH SOMETIMES LEADS TO DIFFERENCES IN NUANCE, BUT A MAJOR BREACH OF DISCIPLINE IS VIRTUALLY UNTHINKABLE.

15. US REPRESENTATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES ARE RECEIVED VERY SERIOUSLY BY GOJ, AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE LIMITED TO KEY ISSUES, IN ORDER TO AVOID DEPRECIATING THE COINAGE. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT JAPAN WILL BE ABLE TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO US REPRESENTATIONS WHICH ARE RECEIVED AFTER JAPAN HAS COMMITTED ITSELF IN COMMITTEE OR IN CAUCUS, AS WAS THE CASE WITH OUR DEMARCHES ON THE MONGOLIAN CANDIDACY FOR THE UN CREDEN-

TIALS COMMITTEE AND TO COMMITTEE OF 24'S RESOLUTION
AGANST US BASES ON GUAM. CONVERSELY, TIMELY INDICATION
OF SERIOUS US CONCERNS CAN HAVE EFFECTIVE: WE HAVE
INDICATIONS THAT A STRONG APPROACH BY THE USG ON THE
ZIONISM-EQUALS-RACISM VOTE COULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR ASSIST
TO THE MOVE TO SHELVE THAT RESOLUTION AND/OR HAVE ONE A
NEGATIVE JAPANESE VOTE.
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